Abstract. This paper introduces the related-key boomerang and the related-key rectangle attacks. These new attacks can expand the cryptanalytic toolbox, and can be applied to many block ciphers. The main advantage of these new attacks, is the ability to exploit the related-key model twice. Hence, even ciphers which were considered resistant to either boomerang or related-key differential attacks may be broken using the new techniques. In this paper we present a rigorous treatment of the related-key boomerang and the related-key rectangle distinguishers. Following this treatment, we devise optimal distinguishing algorithms using the LLR (Logarithmic Likelihood Ratio) statistics. We then analyze the success probability under reasonable independence assumptions, and verify the computation experimentally by implementing an actual attack on a 6-round variant of KASUMI. The paper ends with a demonstration of the strength of our new proposed techniques with attacks on 10-round AES-192 and the full KASUMI.
Introduction
Related-key differentials are an extension of differentials, where the adversary is allowed a control over the key difference along with control over the plaintext/ciphertext differences [23] . The additional control gives the adversary the possibility to cancel differences that enter the nonlinear parts of the cipher, and as a result, the probability of the differential is increased.
While the use of related-key differentials in differential attacks has been studied for more than a decade, the idea of using the related-key differentials in more complex attacks has not been as extensively studied. Although techniques like related-key impossible differential [22] and related-key differential-linear cryptanalysis [11] were used to attack specific ciphers, no systematic analysis was suggested.
In this paper we examine the applicability of related-key differentials in the boomerang and the rectangle attacks. We show that it is possible to change the differentials into related-key differentials, and allow the adversary to enjoy the related-key advantage twice, using two related-key differentials at the expense of using four keys for the attack. 8 
The Related-Key Model
The related-key model was introduced in [4, 28] and deals with attack scenarios where the adversary is given access to encryption under multiple unknown keys, such that the relation between them is known to (or even chosen by) the adversary. While this model might seem too strong, it has practical implications. Amongst the many issues, a block cipher which is not secure against related-key attacks might fail as a hash function (for example, a related-key attack on the block cipher TEA [40] used in Microsoft's Xbox architecture as a hash function, was used to hack the system).
Related-key attacks were intensively studied in the last decade, both from the theoretical [2] and the practical [11, 12, 19, 22, 43] points of view. Immunity to related-key attacks is considered one of the security goals in the design of modern block ciphers [16] .
The Boomerang and the Rectangle Attacks
The boomerang attack [38] is a differential-based attack that uses two short differentials (of few rounds each) rather than one long differential (of many rounds). In an adaptive chosen plaintext and ciphertext process, the adversary constructs boomerang quartets by exploiting the short differentials.
The attack was later transformed into a chosen plaintext variant named the amplified boomerang attack [25] (and then renamed as the rectangle attack [7] ). The transformation is done by a birthday-paradox argument, which leads to a higher data complexity, but still allows the use of two short differentials.
All of these attacks treat the distinguished part of the cipher E as a decomposition into two sub-ciphers, E = E 1 • E 0 , where in each of these two sub-ciphers some (relatively) high probability differential exists. If the probability of the differential of E 0 is p and the probability of the differential of E 1 is q, then the data complexity of the corresponding boomerang distinguisher is O((pq)
−2 ) adaptively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and of the rectangle distinguisher is O(2 n/2 · (pq) −1 ) chosen plaintexts, where n is the block size. In the more complex variants of these attacks the use of multiple differentials is supported as long as they share the input difference in the differentials for E 0 (the first rounds) and share the output difference in the differentials for E 1 (the last rounds). This improvement reduces the data complexity of both attacks significantly.
Our Contributions
We consider the same conceptual division. Let the cipher E be a concatenation of two sub-ciphers, i.e., E = E 1 • E 0 . Furthermore, assume that there exist high-probability related-key differentials in E 0 and in E 1 (not necessarily with the same key difference). We show that in this scenario it is possible to apply related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks. The basic related-key boomerang and rectangle distinguishers are summarized in the following theorem:
n → {0, 1} n be a block cipher. Consider encryptions with E under a secret key K and related-keys whose differences with K are chosen by the adversary. Let
where E 0,K (P ) denotes the partial encryption of P through E 0 under the key K and E We present a rigorous treatment of the related-key boomerang and rectangle distinguishers. We devise the optimal distinguishing algorithms using the LLR metric, and compute their success rate. Using this analysis, we prove Theorem 1, along with an easy lemma allowing to calculate lower bounds forp andq in practical ciphers.
As in other statistical attacks on block ciphers, the calculation of the success probability of our attack is based on some randomness assumptions. We state explicitly the assumptions we use and discuss their validity in various cases. To verify the validity of these assumptions we carried out computer experiments for the related-key boomerang attack on 6-round KASUMI [36] .
We note that the analysis presented in our paper is also the first rigorous analysis of the boomerang/rectangle techniques themselves. Although these techniques were used many times in attacks, a rigorous analysis of them was not performed before.
After the theoretical treatment, we consider several improvements of the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks:
1. The Use of Structures of Keys: We use structures of keys to overcome a wider range of key schedule algorithms. In ciphers with a nonlinear key schedule, a given key difference may cause many subkey differences, thus interfering with the construction of related-key differentials. Structures of keys can be used to reduce the effect of this event on the differentials. 2. The Use of Other Relations between the Keys: While XOR relations are common and inherent to the majority of differential-based related-key attacks, in some cases there are more suitable key relations (either due to the environment of the attack or in order to get higher probabilities of the differentials). We show that the proposed attacks are applicable when the XOR relations between the keys are replaced with different kinds of relations and discuss which relations induce feasible attacks.
We then compare the new attacks with previously proposed related-key techniques. We explore the advantages of the new attacks, and show that in many cases the related-key boomerang and the related-key rectangle attacks are significantly more effective than other related-key techniques, even if in the single-key scenario the boomerang and the rectangle attacks are inferior to the non-relatedkey techniques. Finally, out of the many ciphers for which related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks were applied to (to mention a few, IDEA, MISTY1, SHACAL-1, SHACAL-2, and XTEA), we present two cases that demonstrate the strength and the wide applicability of the new attacks. We chose to concentrate on KA-SUMI and AES, as these two ciphers demonstrate the advantages of using two pairs of related-keys to overcome complex round functions (KASUMI) and using structures of keys to bypass a nonlinear key schedule (AES).
An Attack on 10-round AES-192 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[32] is a 128-bit block cipher with a variable key length (128, 192 , and 256-bit keys are supported). Since its selection, AES gradually became one of the most widely used and analyzed block ciphers. The cipher has received a great deal of cryptanalytic attention, both during the AES process, and even more after its selection.
We present a related-key rectangle attack on 10-round AES-192 requiring 2 119.2 chosen plaintexts encrypted under one of 64 related keys and time complexity of 2 185.2 memory accesses. Our attack uses structures of 64 keys in order to overcome the nonlinearity of the AES key schedule. We summarize our results along with selected other results in Table 1 .
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An Attack on the Full 8-Round KASUMI KASUMI is an 8-round Feistel block cipher used in the confidentiality and the integrity algorithms of some 3GPP mobile communications. Since the 3GPP mobile communications are used by millions of customers, KASUMI is one of the most widely used block ciphers.
We start by presenting a simple 6-round related-key boomerang attack on 6-round KASUMI, which has a practical data and time complexity. We follow to present a related-key rectangle attack on the full 8-round requiring 2 54.6 chosen plaintexts and 2 73.6 encryptions. The cases of AES and KASUMI show the advantage of the related-key boomerang/rectangle attack over the other related-key attacks. While the other techniques can attack the same number of rounds as the best single-key attacks (8 rounds for AES-192 and 6 rounds for KASUMI), the related-key boomerang/rectangle attacks can attack either two more rounds (10 rounds for AES-192 and the full 8-round KASUMI), or the same number of rounds with a significantly lower complexity. We summarize our results along with selected other results in Table 1. 
The Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks and discuss them theoretically. In Section 3 we apply the attacks to the full KASUMI. In Section 4 we apply the attacks to reduced-round AES-192. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the paper.
The Related-Key Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks
In this section we introduce the related-key boomerang and the related-key rectangle attacks. We start with a brief description of the boomerang and the rectangle attacks in the single key model. We then introduce and analyze rigorously the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks. We follow and examine the randomness assumptions used in the attacks. We conclude this section with several generalizations and comparisons of the newly proposed attacks.
Boomerang and Amplified Boomerang (Rectangle) Attacks
The main idea behind the boomerang attack [38] is to use two short differentials with high probabilities instead of one long differential with a low probability. We assume that a block cipher E : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} k → {0, 1} n can be described as a cascade E = E 1 • E 0 , such that for E 0 there exists a differential α → β with probability p, and for E 1 there exists a differential γ → δ with probability q.
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The distinguisher is based on the following boomerang process:
1. Ask for the encryption of a pair of plaintexts (P 1 , P 2 ) such that P 1 ⊕ P 2 = α and denote the corresponding ciphertexts by (C 1 , C 2 ). 2. Calculate C 3 = C 1 ⊕ δ and C 4 = C 2 ⊕ δ, and ask for the decryption of the pair (C 3 , C 4 ). Denote the corresponding plaintexts by (P 3 , P 4 ). 3. Check whether P 3 ⊕ P 4 = α.
The boomerang attack uses the first differential (α → β) for E 0 with respect to the pairs (P 1 , P 2 ) and (P 3 , P 4 ), and the second differential (γ → δ) for E 1 with respect to the pairs (C 1 , C 3 ) and (C 2 , C 4 ).
For a random permutation the probability that the last condition is satisfied is 2 −n , where n is the block size.
12 For E, the probability that the pair (P 1 , P 2 ) is a right pair with respect to the first differential (i.e., the probability that the intermediate difference after E 0 equals β, as predicted by the differential) is p. The probability that both pairs (C 1 , C 3 ) and (C 2 , C 4 ) are right pairs with respect to the second differential is q 2 . If all these are right pairs, then E −1
. Thus, with probability p, P 3 ⊕ P 4 = α. Hence, the total probability of this quartet of plaintexts and ciphertexts to satisfy the condition P 3 ⊕ P 4 = α is at least (pq)
2 . The attack can be mounted for all possible β's and γ's simultaneously (as long as β = γ). Therefore, a right quartet for E is encountered with probability not less than (pq) 2 , where:
Using the boomerang process described above, the cipher E can be distinguished from a random permutation given O((pq) −2 ) adaptively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, provided thatpq ≫ 2 −n/2 . The complete analysis is given in [7, 8, 38] . We omit the analysis here since it is essentially included in the analysis of the related-key boomerang attack presented in Section 2.2.
As the boomerang distinguisher requires adaptively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, it cannot be combined with many of the standard techniques for using distinguishers in key recovery attacks. This led to the introduction of a chosen plaintext variant of the boomerang attack called the amplified boomerang attack [25] , and later renamed as the rectangle attack [7] . The transformation of the boomerang attack into a chosen plaintext attack relies on standard birthdayparadox arguments. The key idea behind the transformation is to encrypt many plaintext pairs with input difference α, and to look for quartets (i.e., pairs of pairs) that conform to the requirements of the boomerang process.
In the rectangle distinguisher, the adversary considers quartets of plaintexts of the form ((P 1 , P 2 = P 1 ⊕ α), (P 3 , P 4 = P 3 ⊕ α)). A quartet is called a "right quartet" if the following conditions are satisfied:
holds along with the previous one). 3 .
The probability of a quartet to be a right quartet is a lower bound on the probability of the event
The usual assumption is that each of the above conditions is independent of the rest, and hence the probability that a given quartet ((
Since for a random permutation, the probability of Condition (1) is 2 −2n , the rectangle process can be used to distinguish E from a random permutation if pq ≫ 2 −n/2 (like in the boomerang distinguisher). The data complexity of the distinguisher is O(2 n/2 (pq) −1 ), which is much higher than the complexity of the boomerang distinguisher. The higher data complexity follows from the fact that the event E 0 (P 1 ) ⊕ E 0 (P 3 ) = γ occurs with a "random" probability of 2 −n (actually, this is the birthday-paradox argument used in the construction). The identification of right quartets is also more complicated than in the boomerang case, as instead of checking a condition on pairs, the adversary has to go over all the possible quartets. At the same time, the chosen plaintext nature allows using stronger key recovery techniques. An optimized method of finding the right rectangle quartets is presented in [8] .
Like the boomerang attack, the rectangle attack can use all the possible β's and γ's simultaneously. This reduces the data complexity of the attack to O(2 n/2 (pq) −1 ), wherep andq are as defined above. The complete analysis of the rectangle attack is given in [7, 8] .
The Related-Key Boomerang Attack
We now present the related-key boomerang distinguisher, and determine the conditions required for the distinguisher to succeed. Following a rigorous treatment we compute the optimal value of the threshold used in the distinguisher using the Logarithmic Likelihood Ratio method. Then we compute the success rate of the distinguisher using a Poisson approximation. In order to keep this section readable, we refrain from presenting a detailed analysis of the key-recovery attack algorithm. The reader is referred to [8] for a generic key-recovery attack algorithm exploiting the boomerang distinguisher (which is easily adapted to the related-key model), and to the specific attack algorithms presented in Sections 3 and 4. First, we recall the definition of related-key differentials and introduce a shorthand used throughout this paper to denote them: Definition 1. We say that a related-key differential α → β with key difference ∆K holds for E with probability p, if In order to present the independence assumption used in the paper, we need another definition: Formally, for a block cipher E and a given key K,
Similarly, we define the set of good ciphertexts:
Our independence assumption asserts that the sets of the form G α
are independent, in the following sense:
Assumption 1 For the block cipher E = E 1 • E 0 under consideration, for any fixed key K, and for any set of differences α, γ 1 , δ, ∆K 0 , and ∆K 1 , we assume
δ is independent of any combination of these three events:
For example, our independence assumption asserts that
This assumption is used implicitly in all the statements in the sequel. We discuss the assumption and its relation to the independence assumptions used in other techniques, such as differential and linear cryptanalysis, in Section 2.4.
The Related-Key Boomerang Distinguisher Now we are ready to present the related-key boomerang distinguisher. Similarly to the boomerang attack, we treat the cipher E as a cascade of sub-ciphers:
For fixed values α and δ, the attack algorithm is the following:
1. Choose M plaintexts at random, and set a counter C to zero. For each plaintext P a , perform the following:
Kc (C c ) and
If yes, increase the value of the counter C by 1. 2. If C > T hreshold, output "The cipher E". Otherwise, output "Random Permutation".
The value of T hreshold will be specified later in this section. See Figure 1 for an outline of a right related-key boomerang quartet. It is easy to see that for a random permutation, the probability that the condition P c ⊕ P d = α is satisfied is 2 −n . The probability that the condition is satisfied for E is given in the following proposition: Consider a quartet (P a , P b , P c , P d ) constructed by the algorithm described above. We have
Proof. Consider a quartet (P a , P b , P c , P d ) constructed by the algorithm. Denote the intermediate values
(where the encryption is under the respective keys) by (X a , X b , X c , X d ), respectively. For all β 1 , γ 1 , γ 2 , we say that the event S β1,γ1,γ2 occurs, if the following conditions are satisfied:
Since the events {S β1,γ1,γ2 } for different values of (β 1 , γ 1 , γ 2 ) are disjoint and their union is the entire space, we have
Pr
If the event S β1,γ1,γ2 occurs, then
Hence, by the independence assumptions,
where β 2 = γ 1 ⊕β 1 ⊕γ 2 . Similarly, the three conditions forming the event S β1,γ1,γ2 are independent, and hence
Substituting Equations (5) and (6) into Equation (4) yields Equation (2).
β1⊕β2⊕γ1⊕γ2=0
Pr α
and thus, Inequality (3) follows from Equation (2).
Proposition 1 shows that ifpq > 2 −n/2 , then the probability that the condition P c ⊕ P d = α holds, is higher for E than for a random permutation, i.e., we expect more quartets in the case of E. We next compute the optimal choice of the value T hreshold used in the distinguisher.
The Optimal Choice of T hreshold The optimal value of T hreshold can be found using the Likelihood Ratio test for the distributions representing Pr[P c ⊕ P d = α] for E and for a random permutation. We use the following standard result: 
where
is the logarithmic likelihood ratio (with the convention that log(0/p) = −∞ and log(p/0) = ∞), and where N (a|z m ) is the number of times a occurs in the sequence z m . 
Since in our distinguisher, the acceptance region of the test is {z
A simple computation shows that the optimal value is
The Success Probability of the Distinguisher We use the following standard definition of the success probability of a distinguisher (see, e.g., [1] ):
The probability of success of A is
Since the distinguisher counts the number of successes amongst M trials, it actually distinguishes between the Binomial distributions Bin(M, p 0 ) and Bin(M, 2 −n ). Hence, given the value T hreshold (as computed in Equation 8), the success probability of the distinguisher is given by the formula:
(9) For a large value of M (like the values usually used in attacks as M has to be at least 1/p 0 , and p 0 is in most cases very small), the Binomial distributions can be approximated by the Poisson distributions P oi(p 0 M ) and P oi(2 −n M ). Using this approximation, Equation (9) is simplified to:
(10) Denote c = M p 0 , and x = p 0 /2 −n . Equation (10) can be reformulated into:
(11) We note that in actual attacks, c usually satisfies 1 ≤ c ≤ 100, while the value x varies significantly between different attacks. In Table 2 , we give the optimal threshold and success rate for several common values of c and x.
When x tends to infinity, Equation (11) can be simplified, as e −c/x tends to 1. In other words, when x ≫ 1, given M = c · p
0 quartets, a threshold of 1 is sufficient to achieve the following success rate:
2 . Table 2 . Optimal Thresholds and Success Rates for Common Parameters The entry X(Y %) means that the optimal threshold is X and the success rate is Y . Imp -it is impossible to gather the amount of data required in this case.
We note that while for attacks based on linear cryptanalysis, the probability of success can be approximated using the Normal distribution (see, e.g., [1, 35]) in attacks based on differential cryptanalysis (like the attacks discussed in this paper) the Normal approximation may be inaccurate. The reason for the difference is that while in linear-based attacks, the value of the measured random variable is big (close to M/2), in differential-based attacks the value is usually very small (e.g., 1 ≤ T hreshold ≤ 10). For such small values, the approximation of a random variable assuming only integer values by a Normal distribution is inaccurate, and hence approximation using a Poisson random variable is preferable.
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Practical Lower Bounds forp andq In practical attacks, the probability of the related-key boomerang distinguisher (given by Equation 2) cannot be computed. Moreover, even the computation of the lower bound given by Inequality (3) is infeasible in most of the cases. Instead, the adversary finds highprobability differential characteristics α In certain cases, especially when a good differential cannot be found, the following simple proposition is useful as a generic lower bound forp andq. Proof. Recall that the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality asserts that for any two sequences {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m } and {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m } of non-negative numbers, we have
Denote the probabilities of the differentials of the form
(ignoring the differentials with zero probability). Clearly, we have
We apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the sequences {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m } and {1, 1, . . . , 1} and get
and hencep ≥ 1/m, as asserted. Furthermore, since equality in the CauchySchwarz inequality holds if and only if the sequences
are proportional (i.e., there exists c such that a i = c · b i for all i), in our case equality holds if and only if all the p i 's are equal.
The generic lower bound given by Proposition 3 can be combined with a "good" differential for part of the rounds.
Proposition 4.
Consider related-key differentials through E 0 with input difference α and key difference ∆K. Assume that there exists a decomposition E 0 = E 01 • E 00 , and a difference α ′ , such that:
2. There exist only m differences β ′ such that Pr[α
Proof. We compute a lower bound onp by considering only the characteristics α
there are only m such differentials (ignoring differentials with probability zero), and the sum of their probabilities is p ′ . The assertion follows from the CauchySchwarz inequality by the same argument as used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Clearly, the same arguments apply also for the computation ofq. Propositions 3 and 4 are used in our attacks on KASUMI and AES-192, presented in Sections 3 and 4.
The Related-Key Rectangle Attack
The transformation of the related-key boomerang attack into the related-key rectangle attack is similar to the transformation of the boomerang attack to the rectangle attack in the single-key model. The related-key rectangle distinguisher involves four different unknown (but related) keys -
For fixed values α and δ, the algorithm of the distinguisher is as follows:
1. Choose M plaintexts P a , and compute P b = P a ⊕ α. Ask for the ciphertexts C a = E Ka (P a ) and
Choose M plaintexts P c , and compute P d = P c ⊕ α. Ask for the ciphertexts C c = E Kc (P c ) and
Set a counter C to zero. 4. For each of the M 2 choices for (P a , P c ) (and the corresponding (P b , P d )): (a) Check whether both conditions C a ⊕C c = δ and
If yes, increase the value of the counter C by 1. 5. If C > T hreshold, output "The cipher E". Otherwise, output "Random Permutation".
The value of T hreshold will be specified later in this section.
It is easy to see that for a random permutation, the probability that both conditions C a ⊕ C c = δ and C b ⊕ C d = δ are satisfied is 2 −2n . The probability that the conditions are satisfied for E is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Consider a quartet of plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Consider a quartet 
Since the events {S β1,β2,γ1 } for different values of (β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 ) are disjoint and their union is the entire space, we have
If the event S β1,β2,γ1 occurs, then
Hence, by the independence assumption,
Applying again the independence assumption, we have
Since P a and P c are chosen independently, then
Note that for any fixed value of P a ⊕ P c and γ 1 , this approximation is rather inaccurate. For an ideal cipher, it is expected that for a fraction e −1/2 of the possible values of γ 1 , we have Pr[X a ⊕ X c = γ 1 ] = 0, and for the other values, the probability is at least 2 −n+1 . However, when the probability is averaged over many different pairs (P a , P c ), the approximation becomes reasonable.
Substituting Equations (15), (16) , and (17) into Equation (14) yields Equation (12) . The proof of Equation (13) given Equation (12) is identical to the derivation of Equation (3) from Equation (2) in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 shows that ifpq > 2 −n/2 , then the probability that the conditions (C a ⊕ C c = δ) and (C b ⊕ C d = δ) hold simultaneously, is higher for E than for a random permutation, and hence Step 2 of the distinguisher makes sense.
The optimal choice of T hreshold and the computation of the success probability of the distinguisher given the probability
are very similar to the respective steps for the related-key boomerang distinguisher presented in Section 2.2, and hence are omitted here. A key recovery attack based on the related-key rectangle distinguisher is more complicated than the respective related-key boomerang attack, due to the abundance of quartets the adversary has to examine. We do not describe the key-recovery algorithm here, and refer the reader to the algorithm of the rectangle key-recovery attack in [8] , that can be easily adopted to the related-key model. We note that Table 2 can also be applied to the case of the rectangle attack, with a different value for p 0 , c and x: For the related-key rectangle attack
, and c is the number of expected quartets (i.e., given M = c/p 0 pairs).
The Independence Assumptions
All statistical cryptanalytic techniques require various randomness assumptions. For example, the construction of differential characteristics uses the assumption that the cipher is a Markov cipher (see [6] ), which implies that the characteristics of single rounds are independent of each other and can be combined. Linear cryptanalysis is based on Matsui's Piling up Lemma [31] , which essentially asserts that linear approximations of single rounds are independent. These randomness assumptions allow a rigorous treatment of the techniques, as well as better applicability (since the search of differentials and linear approximations can be done for each round separately). It is easy to construct artificial examples of ciphers that do not satisfy the randomness assumptions, which would result in failure of the differential or the linear attacks. However, based on many experimental results, it is reasonable to assume that most of the ciphers satisfy the randomness assumptions. Moreover, if some cipher does not satisfy these assumptions, then this non-randomness is probably exploitable in some other attack, e.g., impossible differential attack. Nevertheless, it is important to verify the attacks experimentally whenever possible in order to assure that the assumptions indeed hold in the specific case of interest.
The randomness assumption used in the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks (i.e., Assumption 1) has two parts. The second part of the assumption, that essentially asserts that differentials of different parts of the cipher are independent, is similar to the standard assumption that the cipher is Markovian, which is used in differential cryptanalysis. However, the first part of Assumption 1 is relatively stronger than the assumptions used in differential cryptanalysis.
Differential cryptanalysis is based on the assumption that for any fixed key K and any (related-key) differential (α → β), the set G K (α → β) is distributed randomly and uniformly in the plaintext space.
14 In the relatedkey boomerang and rectangle attacks, the assumption deals with the distribution of pairs of sets of the class
β . We assume that any two pairs of such sets are independent, i.e., the events X ∈ G K γ 1
To show the problem that may exist in the independence assumptions, we give the following simple artificial example, which uses high probability differentials.
Assume that for given K, α, and β, for which M SB(β) = 0 (i.e., the most significant bit of β is 0), we have G
and G 
we have M SB(X a ) = 1, and thus, since M SB(γ) = 0, necessarily M SB(X c ) =
1. This implies that X c ∈ G
, and thus, the actual probability of the distinguisher is zero!
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This example demonstrates failure of the first part of Assumption 1 (independence inside the same sub-cipher). Similarly, the second part of the assumption fails if we assume that for some K, α, β, γ and δ, we have G
, since in this 14 There are cases in which this cannot be satisfied even in a regular cipher as shown in [17] , where the behavior of differential characteristics with probability lower than 2 −n is shown to be dependent on the key. This is also the case for weak key classes, i.e., classes of keys which behave significantly different than random. 15 Actually, the probability of the distinguisher may be higher due to differentials of the form (α
However, if there are no high-probability differentials of this form, the probability of the distinguisher is still significantly lower than the predicted value 1/16.
case X a cannot be element in both G
We note that in several specific cases, deviations from the prediction of the independence assumptions were detected in "real" ciphers. Such an example is the ladder switch described in [14] , where higher probability for the related-key boomerang distinguisher is obtained using dependencies.
Luckily, in the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks, there are several mechanisms which may overcome dependence problems. The first is the fact that in the attack we count over many differentials (all β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 such that β 1 ⊕ β 2 ⊕ γ 1 ⊕ γ 2 = 0), which ensures that even if there is a problem in some combination of differentials, it is expected that other combinations still succeed. The second one is the fact that four different keys are used (in the case ∆K 0 = ∆K 1 ),and thus, even if there is a dependence between the differentials, it is slightly countered by the different keys.
Experimental Verification of the Randomness Assumption As follows from the discussion above, in the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks it is very important to verify the independence assumption practically in any specific case. Unfortunately, in many of the cases it is impossible due to the high complexity of the attack. Moreover, for the rectangle attack such verification is inherently impossible: the data complexity of the attack is lower-bounded by 2 n/2 and infeasible for any block cipher with block size of 128 bits or more (e.g., AES). For the boomerang attack, it is sometimes possible to challenge the independence assumptions for a reduced-round variant of the attack, e.g., for a variant containing one or two rounds in each sub-cipher. However, this verification is not fully sufficient, since in the full attack, the overall probability of the distinguisher is an average taken over many possible differentials, while in the reduced-round variant only a small subset of the differentials is considered. It is possible that while the reduced-round attack does not satisfy the independence assumption, the full attack does satisfy it, since the deviations from independence for different characteristics cancel each other.
As an example of the validity of Assumption 1, we experimentally verified the related-key boomerang distinguisher on 6-round KASUMI, presented in Section 3.3. The predicted rate of experiments with at least one quartet of 86.5% was met with an 87% of the experiments showing one such quartet after 10,000 experiments, proving the validity of the analysis for 6-round KASUMI. For more details, we refer the reader to Section 3.3.
Generalizations of the Related-Key Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks
In this section we briefly present two generalizations of the basic related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks.
Using Structures of Keys
The related-key differentials used in the attack are usually based on fixed subkey differences. If the key schedule of the attacked cipher is linear, such differences can be achieved by choosing the appropriate key difference. However, if the key schedule is nonlinear, a fixed key difference does not ensure fixed subkey differences. Instead, the adversary can apply differential cryptanalysis to the key schedule. By studying the differential properties of the key schedule, the adversary can find a key difference that leads to the required subkey differences with a relatively high probability. Then, the adversary can repeat the attack for many pairs of related-keys and expect that in one of the pairs, the required subkey differences are satisfied and the basic related-key boomerang/rectangle attack can be applied. Furthermore, we observe that the number of keys used in the attack can be reduced by using structures of keys. Instead of finding a single key difference leading to the required subkey differences with a high probability, the adversary can find many such key differences (possibly with lower probabilities). Then, the adversary can use structures of keys such that each structure contains many pairs of keys corresponding to different "key characteristics", and thus reduce the number of keys required for the attack.
A concrete example of this improvement can be found in the attack on AES-192 in Section 4. The improvement uses 127 key characteristics in parallel, and succeeds to reduce the number of keys required for the attack from 256 to 64.
Generalizing the Key Relation While XOR relations are common and inherent to the majority of differential-based related-key attacks, in some cases other key relations are more suitable (either due to the environment of the attack or in order to obtain higher probabilities of the differentials). The related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks can be applied almost without a change when the XOR key relations are replaced by any relation satisfying a condition specified below.
Denote the relation between the keys K and K ′ by R(K, K ′ ). We note that R can be any relation which is symmetric, and covers all keys. At the same time, we recall the fact that the more complex the relation R is, the applicability of the related-key attack may be affected. For example, in the basic related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks we can set R(K, K ′ ) = K ⊕ K ′ . The boomerang and rectangle attacks can be applied whenever the key relation satisfies the following condition:
Condition (18) ensures that in each of the sub-ciphers, the same key relation is used in both differentials. For example, for XOR differences
and hence the condition holds. Condition (18) is satisfied for a wide variety of key relations, including additive differences (e.g., R(K, K ′ ) = (K − K ′ ) mod 2 n ) and rotations. On the other hand, the condition does not hold if the relation used in the first subcipher (i.e., between (K a , K b ) and (K c , K d )) and the relation used in the second sub-cipher (i.e., between (K a , K c ) and (K b , K d )) are of different classes (e.g., XOR differences in the first sub-cipher and modular differences in the second sub-cipher).
We note that the basic related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks can be extended to use different values α, α ′ in the related-key differentials of E 0 , and δ, δ ′ in the related-key differentials of E 1 . Similarly, the attack can use different key differences ∆K 0 , ∆K 
The related-key rectangle attack can be applied if the relations
Finally, even if the condition of Proposition 6 is not satisfied, in some cases the attack can be still applied using structures of keys, as described earlier.
Comparison With Other Related-Key Attacks
For any new technique constructed as a combination of existing techniques, a natural question to ask is whether there are cases in which the combined attack is better than each of its components taken separately. In this section we briefly describe several important cases in which the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks are expected to outperform each of their components. Concrete examples of the advantage of related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks over other attack techniques are given in Sections 3 and 4.
The main advantage of the related-key differential attacks over ordinary differential attacks is the ability of the adversary to use the subkey differences to cancel the plaintext difference in the input of one (or more) of the non-linear parts of the cipher. As a result, the adversary obtains one (or more) rounds in the differential that hold with probability 1, allowing the extension the differential by one (or more) rounds.
In the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks, the adversary can enjoy this advantage twice, once in each of the sub-ciphers. As a result, the overall distinguisher can be extended by two (and in some cases even more) rounds. This is a significant advantage of the related-key boomerang/rectangle attack over all other differential-based related-key attacks (e.g., related-key differential attack, related-key impossible differential attack and related-key differential-linear attack) that can enjoy the advantage of the related-key model only once.
The advantage of gaining a single additional round (or two rounds) to the distinguisher is significant in ciphers in which the number of rounds is small and each round function is relatively strong. Hence, the gain of the related-key boomerang/rectangle attack is expected to be significant in ciphers like AES [32] and KASUMI [36] .
Another property of the cipher required for the success of related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks is simplicity of the key schedule. The basic version of the attack is applicable only to ciphers with a linear key schedule, but using structures of keys the attack can be applied to ciphers with a nonlinear key schedule as well. However, if the key schedule of the cipher is complex enough and does not have "good" differential properties, then the number of keys required for the attack becomes infeasibly big.
Summarizing the discussion above, the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks are expected to be successful if the attacked cipher has the following properties:
-A small number of relatively strong rounds.
-A relatively simple key schedule.
The class of ciphers satisfying these properties includes widely used ciphers such as AES [32] , KASUMI [36] , and IDEA [30] . These three ciphers can be indeed attacked efficiently using the related-key boomerang/rectangle attack technique.
3 Related-Key Boomerang/Rectangle Attacks on KASUMI
The KASUMI Block Cipher
KASUMI [36] is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys, with a recursive Feistel structure, following its ancestor, MISTY1. The cipher has eight Feistel rounds, where each round is composed of two functions: the F O function which is in itself a 3-round 32-bit Feistel construction, and the F L function that mixes a 32-bit subkey with the data in a linear way. The order of the two functions depends on the round number: in the even rounds the F L function is applied first, and in the odd rounds the F O function is applied first. The F O function also has a recursive structure: its F -function, called F I, is a four-round Feistel construction. The F I function uses two non-linear S-boxes S7 and S9 (where S7 is a 7-bit to 7-bit permutation and S9 is a 9-bit to 9-bit permutation), and accepts an additional 16-bit subkey, that is mixed with the data. In total, a 96-bit subkey enters F O in each round -48 subkey bits are used in the F I functions and 48 subkey bits are used in the key mixing stages.
The F L function accepts a 32-bit input and two 16-bit subkey words. One subkey word affects the data using the OR operation, while the second one affects the data using the AND operation. We outline the structure of KASUMI and its parts in Fig. 2 . ? 
(X ≪ i) -X rotated to the left by i bits
The key schedule of KASUMI is very simple and the subkeys are derived from the key linearly. The 128-bit key K is divided into eight 16-bit words:
where the C i 's are fixed constants (we omit these from the paper as they have no effect on our results). We denote the bits of the subkeys by K i = (K In each round, eight words are used as the round subkey (up to some in-word rotations). Therefore, the 128-bit subkey of each round is linearly dependent on the secret key in a very simple way. We give the key schedule algorithm of KASUMI in Table 3 .
Related-Key Differentials of KASUMI
In our attacks we use three related-key differentials: a 4-round differential for rounds 1-4, and 3-round differentials for rounds 4-6 and rounds 5-7. Note that the change in the order between F O and F L requires to use two 3-round differentials.
A 4-Round Related-Key Differential for Rounds 1-4 Our attack on the full KASUMI uses a related-key differential of rounds 1-4 of KASUMI which is an extension by one round of the related-key differential presented in [15] . The input difference of this differential is α = (0 x , 0020 0000 x ), where the key difference is ∆K ab = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), i.e., only the third key word has a nonzero difference ∆K 3 = 0001 x . The first three rounds of the characteristic have probability 1/4, and due to the Feistel structure, the α difference can propagate to at most 2 32 differences after round 4. Hence, by Proposition 4, we havê
We outline the differential in Figure 3 . It was further observed in [15] that the probability of the differential can be increased by controlling two plaintext bits. If the adversary assigns one bit of ? the plaintexts to be one (thus fixing one bit of the output of the OR operation in F L1) and one bit of the plaintexts to be zero (thus fixing one bit of the output of the AND operation in F L1), then the probability of the differential described in [15] is increased to 1/2. As a result, for our 4-round differential we havep ≥ 2 −17 .
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We note that it is possible to rotate all the words of the key difference ∆K ab and of the differential by the same number of bits, without changing the probability of the differential. Hence, the above differential can be replaced by 15 equivalent differentials.
3-Round Related-Key Differential for Rounds 5-7
The 3-round relatedkey differential used in rounds 5-7 is the 3-round differential of [15] shifted by four rounds and rotated by one position to the right. The key difference is ∆K ac = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8000 x , 0), and the data differences are γ = (0 x , 0010 0000 x ) → (0 x , 0010 0000 x ) = δ. Since we use a single differential (and not count over other possibilities), we haveq = q = 1/4.
As before, it is possible to obtain 15 equivalent differentials by rotating the key difference in ∆K 7 and rotating the data differences correspondingly.
3-Round Related-Key Differential for Rounds 4-6.
In rounds 4-6 we use conditional related-key differential characteristics [3] , i.e., characteristics that depend on some unknown key bit. Let δ 0 = (0010 0000 x , 0 x ), δ 1 = (0010 0040 x , 0 x ), and δ ′ = (0001 0000 x , 0 x ). If K has the corresponding value.
For example, we describe the difference propagation in the backward direction of the characteristics δ 0 → δ 0 and δ 0 ⊕ δ ′ → δ 0 . Consider a pair with ciphertext difference δ 0 = (0010 0000 x , 0 x ). In round 6 the zero difference is preserved with probability 1/2 (i.e., the key difference is cancelled with probability 1/2). In round 5, we need a difference of 0010 0000 x after F L5, which is then cancelled with the key difference in KO 5,1 . If K 4 5 = 0, then this is indeed the case with probability 1. In round 4, the zero difference is preserved by the F O4 function. As in round 6, it has probability 1/2 to be preserved also by F L4, and probability 1/2 to evolve into δ 0 ⊕δ ′ . Thus, the input difference of the differential characteristic is either δ 0 or δ 0 ⊕ δ ′ , with probability 1/4 each. In the attack, we apply the distinguisher twice, once with each pair of characteristics, and expect that in one of the applications, both differentials hold with probability 1/4.
17 For that application, we havê
We note that the four conditional differential characteristics we use can be rotated along with the key difference, to produce 15 similar sets of differential characteristics with the same probabilities.
Related-Key Boomerang Distinguisher on 6-Round KASUMI
In this section we present a related-key boomerang distinguisher for 6-round KASUMI. The distinguisher we present applies to rounds 1-6 of KASUMI, but it can be easily adapted to rounds 2-7 or 3-8, as well. Let E 0 be rounds 1-3, and let E 1 be rounds 4-6. In E 0 we use the differential α = (0 x , 0020 0000 x ) → (0 x , 0020 0000 x ) with key difference ∆K ab = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). As shown in Section 3.2, the probability of the differential in the forward direction is 1/2 (after adding constraints on the plaintexts), and the probability in the backward direction is 1/4. In E 1 we use the two pairs of differentials (δ 0 → δ 0 , δ 0 ⊕δ ′ → δ 0 ), and (δ 1 → δ 1 , δ 1 ⊕δ ′ → δ 1 ), both with key difference ∆K ac = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0). As shown in Section 3.2, one of the pairs of differentials yields overall probability ofq = 1/ √ 8 (where the "successful" pair depends on the value of the key bit K 4 5 ). 17 We note that the knowledge of the "successful" pair of characteristics reveals the value of the key bit K The attack essentially performs two standard related-key boomerang distinguishers, one for each possible value of the key bit K 4 5 . To reduce the data complexity of the attack, we share some of the chosen plaintexts between the two distinguishers. The attack algorithm requires four keys:
The algorithm of the distinguisher is as follows:
For each pair, ask for the encryption of P a,i and P b,i under the keys K a and K b , respectively, and denote the corresponding ciphertexts by C a,i and
for the decryption of C c,i and C d,i under the keys K c and K d , respectively, and denote the corresponding plaintexts by P c,i and
for the decryption of C e,i and C f,i under the keys K c and K d , respectively, and denote the corresponding plaintexts by P e,i and P f,i . 4. Check whether P c,i ⊕ P d,i = α and count the number of such occurrences. 5. Check whether P e,i ⊕ P f,i = α and count the number of such occurrences. 6. If one of the two counters from Steps 4 and 5 is greater than zero, then output "6-Round KASUMI". Otherwise, output "Not 6-Round KASUMI".
The total probability of the boomerang process of this distinguisher is
, either for quartets counted in Step 4 or for quartets counted in Step 5. Therefore, for M = 128 we expect to find two right quartets in Step 4 or in Step 5 (either for the quartets (P a,i , P b,i , P c,i , P d,i ) or for the quartets (P a,i , P b,i , P e,i , P f,i )). The right quartets can be detected effectively as for a random cipher the probability of the event P c,i ⊕ P d,i = α (or the event P e,i ⊕ P f,i = α) is 2 −64 . We note that if two right quartets are expected, then the probability that none is found is about 14%, i.e., the success rate of the attack is about (86% + 100%)/2 = 93%. The data complexity is 3 · 128 · 2 = 768 adaptively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, such that 256 chosen plaintexts are encrypted and 512 adaptively chosen ciphertexts are decrypted. The time complexity of the attack is negligible.
We verified the distinguishing attack experimentally. We sampled 10,000 random keys, and ran the above distinguisher with M = 128. By the analysis presented above, we expected that in 86.5% of the experiments there will be at least one right quartet. Our experiments revealed that in 87% there was at least one such quartet. We outline in Table 4 the number of quartets suggested in each experiments and compare it with the expected number based on Poisson distribution with a mean of 2. As can be seen from the table, the figures seem to be highly correlated. As noted in [10] , this distinguisher can be transformed into a key recovery attack. The key recover attack has a total data and time complexities of 2 13 . The number of keys used in the attack is 34.
The Basic Related-Key Rectangle Attack on the Full KASUMI
Our attack on the full KASUMI applies the related-key rectangle distinguisher in rounds 1-7 and retrieves subkey material in round 8. Let ∆K ab = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and ∆K ac = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8000 x , 0, 0), and let
be the unknown related keys we want to retrieve. In rounds 1-4 we use the related-key differential presented in Section 3.2 that has an input difference α = (0 x , 0020 0000 x ), a key difference ∆K ab and for whichp = 2 −17 . 19 In rounds 5-7 we use the related-key differential presented in Section 3.2 that has an output difference δ = (0 x , 0010 0000 x ), a key difference ∆K ac and for whichq = 2 −2 .
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We start with N = 2 51 pairs of plaintexts encrypted under K a and K b , and the same number of plaintext pairs encrypted under K c and K d . This data set contains N 2 = 2 102 quartets, of which about N 2 ·2 −64 ·2 −34 ·2 −4 = 2 102 ·2 −102 = 1 are expected to be right rectangle quartets. In the attack we identify the candidate quartets out of all possible quartets, and then analyze them to retrieve the subkey of round 8.
Denote the 64-bit plaintext P by (P L , P R ), where each 32-bit half is composed of two 16-bit halves, i.e., P = ((P LL , P LR ), (P RL , P RR )). The attack algorithm is as follows:
(a) Choose a structure of 2 51 pairs of plaintexts (P a , P b ), where P b = P a ⊕ α, P 0 aLL = 0 (i.e., the least significant bit of P aLL is fixed to zero for all the plaintexts in the structure), and P 1 aLR = 1.
21 For each pair, ask for the encryption of P a and P b under the keys K a and K b , respectively, and insert each pair of ciphertexts into a hash table indexed by the 64-bit value of (C aRL , C aRR , C bRL , C bRR ). (b) Choose a structure of 2 51 pairs of plaintexts (P c , P d ), where P d = P c ⊕ α, P 0 cLL = 0, and P 1 cLR = 1. For each pair, ask for the encryption of P c and P d under the keys K c and K d , respectively. Then, access the hash table in the entry corresponding to the value (C cRL ⊕ 0010 x , C cRR , C dRL ⊕ 0010 x , C dRR ). For each pair (P a , P b ) found in this entry, apply Step 2 on the quartet (P a , P b , P c , P d ).
In the first step described above, the (2 51 ) 2 = 2 102 possible quartets are filtered according to a condition on the 64 bits of difference which are known (due to the output difference δ), which leaves about 2 38 quartets to Step 2. In this step, we treat all the remaining quartets as right quartets. Under this assumption, we know not only the actual inputs to round 8, but also the output differences. We guess 32 bits of the key (KO 8,1 , KI 8,1 ), and try to deduce KL 8,2 . Step 2(a), guess the 32-bit value of KO 8,3 and KI 8, 3 , and use this information to compute the input and output differences of the AND operation in both pairs. For each bit of the 16-bit AND operation of F L8, the possible values of the corresponding bit of KL 8,1 are given in Step 2, guess the remaining 32 bits of the key, and perform a trial encryption.
Analysis of the Attack
We first analyze Step 2(a), and show that given the input and output differences of the OR operation in the two pairs of the quartet, the expected number of suggestions for the key KL 8,2 is 2 −16 . Let us examine a difference in some bit j. For each pair, there are four combinations of input difference and output difference in this bit. Table 5 lists the values that the two pairs suggest for the respective key bit.
In the table there are nine entries that contain no value, which means a contradiction. For example, a difference 0 can never lead to a difference 1 by any linear function. Another possible contradiction occurs when one pair suggests that the key bit is 0, while the second pair suggests that the key bit is 1. The total number of suggestions for the key bit is 8. Since the table has 16 entries, the average number of suggested values for the key bit is 1/2. In total, for the 16 bits there are (1/2) 16 = 2 −16 key suggestions on average. A similar analysis can be applied to Step 2(b).
We note that the identification of suggested values (or of the found contradictions) can be done efficiently in a bit-sliced manner. Hence, we conclude that this step can be implemented efficiently (for each quartet and initial subkey guess).
Step Step 3 goes over all 2 70 suggestions for the 96 key bits, and tries to complete the remaining 32 key bits by an exhaustive search. This can be performed easily due to the linear key schedule of KASUMI. The time complexity of this step is 2 102 trial encryptions. As the complexity of Step 3 is dominant, the total complexity of this attack is 2 102 trial encryptions.
Improvements of the Attack
In this section we present several improvements of the attack that allow to decrease its time complexity considerably.
Improvement of Step 3
Step 3 can be improved by using key ranking techniques. Taking 2 52.6 plaintexts encrypted under four different keys (i.e., three times the data as before), we expect nine right quartets. Instead of completing the missing key bits by an exhaustive key search, we count how many (quartet, subkey guess) tuples suggest each value of the 96 bits of KO 8,1 , KI 8,1 , KO 8,3 , KI 8,3 , KL 8,1 and KL 8,2 . Only a few possible wrong key values are expected to get more than five suggestions. On the other hand, the right key has probability 88.4% to have at least this number of suggestions. Therefore, we identify which 96-bit values have more than five suggestions, and exhaustively search over the remaining bits of these cases. After this modification, the time complexity of
Step 3 becomes negligible compared to that of Step 2(b 
KASUMI encryptions.
Third Improvement of Step 2(b) Finally, we offer another improvement that is based on a more delicate attack procedure. We recall that for a random input/output difference to an S-box, there is on average one pair of actual values which fit these differences.
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Denote the input and output of F L8 by (Y 0 , X 0 ) and (Y 1 , X 1 ), respectively. The relation between the input and the output of F L8 is given by
) be the differences in the input and the output of F L8 for the considered pair. Note that the output difference is known to the adversary, and after the guess of KO 8,1 and KI 8,1 , the adversary can also compute Y ′ 0 .
In the modified variant of the attack, in Step 2(b) the adversary guesses only KO 8,3 , and not KI 8, 3 . Like in the first improvement of Step 2(b), the step is divided into two sub-steps. The first sub-step collects suggestions for the 9-bit subkey KI 8,3,1 and the second sub-step collects suggestions for the 7-bit subkey KI 8,3,2 .
The First Sub-Step: The knowledge of KO 8,3 allows the adversary to compute the input difference to the second S9 S-box of the function F I 8, 3 . Moreover, the output difference of that S-box is given by the 9 corresponding bits of X Hence, assuming that the differences Y ′ 0 are distributed uniformly, the expected number of candidates a pair suggests for KI 8,3,1 is
We note that this is also the average time complexity associated with this procedure (for the first pair). Then, for the analysis of the second pair, one can either repeat the procedure, and compute the intersection of the two lists, or just try the keys offered by the first procedure. Of course, a more efficient approach is to start with the pair that is going to suggest less keys (i.e., the one for which Y ′ 0 has more 0's). Repeating the analysis presented above, and taking into consideration this fact, it is expected that the pair with lower hamming weight requires 2 
A Different 8-Round Rectangle Attack
It is also possible to apply a slightly different attack algorithm, which is based on a 6-round related-key rectangle distinguisher. The distinguisher is used in rounds 2-7, where the first related-key differential (used in rounds 2-4) is the differential of rounds 4-6 presented in Section 3.2 (shifted two rounds backwards), and the second related-key differential is used in rounds 5-7. The associated probabilities arep = 1/ √ 8, andq = 1/4, respectively. Hence, given 2 72 quartets with the right input differences, we expect about
The attack uses 16 structures, each composed of three sets of 2 32 plaintexts each. The structures are of the form P = {A, x} for a fixed A, and all possible x's which are encrypted under K a and K c , and P 0 = {A⊕δ 0 , x} and P 1 = {A⊕δ 1 , x}, each encrypted under K b and K d . For sake of clarity, we describe the attack for K We search for quartets composed of ((P a , P b ), (P c , P d )) with input difference δ 0 after the first round (in the pairs (P a , P b ) and (P c , P d )), and difference α before the last round (in the pairs (P a , P c ) and (P b , P d )). To do so, for each pair of structures, the adversary finds all the candidate quartets (out of possible 2 128 quartets, only 2 64 satisfy the known ciphertext differences Each round of AES applies the SB, SR, MC and ARK operations in that order. Before the first round, an additional ARK operation is performed (using the whitening key), and in the last round, the MC operation is omitted. For more details of the above four transformations, we refer the reader to [16] .
AES uses different key scheduling algorithms according to the length of the key. where RotByte represents one byte rotation to the left and Rcon denotes an array of fixed constants. The 128-bit block of AES is represented by a 4 × 4 byte matrix. Throughout the paper we treat the internal state as bytes ((0,1,2,3) , (4, 5, 6, 7) , (8, 9, 10, 11) , (12, 13, 14, 15) ) (see Figure 4 for a graphical representation). 
Preliminaries
We first define some notation which is used in our attacks on AES. Denote the 10 first rounds of AES-192 by
, where E b is round 0 including the whitening key addition step and excluding the key addition step of round 0, E 0 is rounds 1-4 (starting from the AddRoundKey operation of round 0), E 1 is rounds 5-8 and E f is round 9. In our 10-round AES-192 attack, we use the related-key differential for E 0 depicted in Fig. 5 and the related-key differential for E 1 depicted in Fig. 6 . We use these related-key differentials for constructing a related-key rectangle distinguisher for E 1 • E 0 , that allows us to recover some portion of the keys in E b and E f .
Let K a , K b , K c , K d be a quartet of keys satisfying the subkey differences required for the related-key differential (or that we conjecture that they satisfy these subkey differences). Then K w x is the whitening key derived from K x and K i x is the ith round subkey derived from K x . We use the notation P x to denote a plaintext encrypted under K x . The intermediate value in the encryption of P x is denoted by I i x (the input to round i). Besides the key differences ∆K ab and ∆K ac , we use ∆I . Finally, HW b (X) denotes the hamming weight in bytes of X, x denotes an 8-bit difference, y, z denote (not necessarily different) 8-bit differences such that x can evolve to y or z through the SubBytes operation, and * denotes an unknown byte difference. 
8-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher
Our related-key differentials exploit the slow difference propagation of the key schedule of , that allows three consecutive rounds for which the Hamming weight in bytes of the key differences is 2,0,1, respectively, as shown in Figure 6 . The differential used for E 0 is depicted in Figure 5 . Its key difference ∆K ab equals x in bytes 1 of W [0] and W [2] , and is zero in all the other bytes (see Figure 6 ). The input difference α equals x in bytes X 9,13 and zero in the rest of the bytes, such that it cancels with the subkey difference, and the input difference to round 1 becomes ∆I 1 ab = 0. Since there are at most 2 39 possible output differences, it follows from Proposition 3 thatp ≥ √ 2 −39 = 2 −19.5 . The second differential, depicted in Figure 6 , is a truncated differential. Its output difference set ∆I As for the key difference, it appears that the required subkey differences (presented in Figure 6 ) cannot be assured by any fixed key difference. The subkey difference pattern requires some cancellation (in byte 11 of ∆K 3 ac ), that occurs with probability 2 −7 . Hence, this differential can be interpreted as a weak key class or a conditional differential. Fortunately, the relation can be assured with a small set of keys.
In order to computeq, we take all the possible input differences ∆I . Summing over all of them yieldsq ≥ 2 −27.9 . Therefore, the overall probability of the rectangle distinguisher (i.e., Pr[I (a) Partially encrypt all the plaintexts through the 8 active S-boxes of round 0, and find all pairs (P a , P b ) with difference 23 α just before the AddRoundKey of round 0 (where P x is encrypted under K x ). Denote the corresponding ciphertexts by (C a , C b ) respectively. Each pair of structures (S For each such quartet, check that the difference C a ⊕ C c is the same in bytes 11 and 15 (denoted by z ac ), and check the same for C b ⊕ C d (where the difference is denoted by z bd ). Check that x input difference to the S-box may cause z ac and z bd output differences (otherwise, discard the quartet 
